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Rastafarians and the Law - the Systematic Repression of Religious Freedom in America - Rastafarians and the Law |
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Written by JAB
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Tuesday, 21 December 1999 |
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Page 2 of 3
The Defendant also directs this Court to consider the 1993 Religious Freedom Restoration Act, (“the RFRA”), adopted by Congress. 42 U.S.C.A. Section 2000bb. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 signed into law by President Clinton in 1993, protects the free exercise of religion. It states:
“...the government shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from the rule of general applicability person whose religious exercise has been substantially burdened in violation of this section may assert that violation as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding.”
Under the Act, Congress required government to accommodate religious belief by giving religions special treatment unless there was compelling reason not to do so. The Defendant claims that under such an heightened standard of review, the People cannot adequately demonstrate a compelling reason that justifies it making the use of marijuana illegal for the Defendant to use within the practice of his religion. The People, however, argue that the law is one of general application, and that the Defendant is being charged with importation of marijuana as opposed to possession. The People, relying on Employment Division, Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, assert that because the statute is one of general application, strict scrutiny does not apply, 496 U.S. 913, 110 S.Ct. 2605 (1990) (virtually eliminate the requirement that the government justify burdens on religious exercise imposed by laws neutral toward religion.)
The question then becomes whether the RFRA, which codified the “compelling interest” standard of the First Amendment, is still viable in Guam. It is has been established in other context, such as in the Insular Cases, that constitutional provisions that apply to the States do not apply to Guam, as an unincorporated territory. See Balzac v. Puerto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 42 S.Ct. 343 (1922) (Sixth Amendment inapplicable to territories); Ocampo v. United States, 234 U.S. 91, 34 S.Ct. 712 (1914) (Fifth Amendment grand jury provision inapplicable to territories). More recently, the Ninth Circuit held that the Commerce clause does not apply to Guam because Guam is not a State, Sakamoto v. Duty Free Shoppers, 764 F.2d 1285 (9th Cir. 1985) (The central concern of the Commerce Clause was that states did not employ discriminatory practices that favored in-state interests to the detriment of the out-of-state interest.) The court found that while previous courts had assumed that the commerce clause applied, the issue was never previously raised or discussed, and hence, it found that contrary to that assumption, the commerce clause in fact did not apply to Guam.
The free exercise of religion is substantially burdened by statute if it requires a person to refrain from engaging in a practice important to his or her religion, or forces the person to choose between following a particular religious practice or accepting the statutes benefit. Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 146, 140-41, 107 S.Ct. 1046 (1987). The Court is mindful of the Supreme Courts view that the court has no authority to determine the truthfulness or reasonableness of the defendants convictions. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86-87, 64 S.Ct. 882 (1944) (reversible error to submit the question of validity of religious belief to the trier of fact.); Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 699, 109 S.Ct. 2136 (1989) (rejecting free exercise challenge to payment of income taxes allegedly to make religious activities more difficult.) Notwithstanding, although the courts should not pass judgment on which religion is bona fide or fake, the Court must make a preliminary inquiry in order to distinguish sham claims from sincere ones. People v. Woody, 394 P.2d 813 (Ca. 1964).
The Court finds that for the purpose of this matter, Defendant has demonstrated that he is a legitimate member of the Rastafarian religion and has established that the use of marijuana is a necessary sacrament in the practice of his Rastafarian religion. See People v. Woody, 61 Cal.2d 716, 394 P.2d 813 (Ca. 1964) (religious belief may be proven through circumstantial evidence); U.S. v. Meyers, 906 F.Supp 1494 (D. Wyo. 1994) (minimum threshold to prove religious belief). The people have not offered anything in opposition to Defendant's claim, and have chosen to concede the allegations. Thus, this Court will accept the Defendant's statement on religious beliefs as true, and in the determination of this matter will not review the validity of those religious beliefs.
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